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Internationalization based on direct foreign investment is proving to be a key economic 
factor for the transformation economies of Eastern Central Europe. The decisive 
influence factors in this process are primarily major investments by groups based on 
longer-term strategies with the new locations. 
The effects linked with this at factory and regional levels are discussed in the study 
using the example of the auto and components industry. The sector was chosen because 
it is one of those very strongly linked with such major projects. The Volkswagen group's 
two prominent investment projects, Škoda in the Czech Republic and Audi in Hungary, 
are used to illustrate two things. First, that there was very accelerated implementation of 
the operational expansion of competences, in terms of new products, modern production 
structures, international competitiveness, and quality standards achieved. Second, that 
this was able to be done because of the especially highly skilled workers in the area. As 
a consequence, the firms have since been able to achieve not just strong positions within 
their respective national economies, but also within the VW group. However, by 
contrast, impulses for local industry emanating from the major investments have 
remained very limited. The study attributes this development to a coincidence of various 
causes. These include, above all, structural change in the auto industry over the past few 
years, the VW group's specific modernization path, and weak governance on the part of 
the transformation countries' governments. 
The results arising from the extended perspective of globalization and transformation 
underlying the group's project approach clearly indicate that increased international 
competition has strengthened the Eastern Central European region's comparative 
constellation of advantages. This consists of high-skill structures at low-cost conditions. 
It is unclear how far further reaching industrial upgrading at factory and regional levels 
can still be achieved in the countries in the face of increased East-West locational 
competition linked with this. The authors interpret this as a question of implementing 
new transnational arrangements limiting the negative consequences for locations in the 
West as well. Contents 
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Foreign direct investment has played an important role in the societal transformation 
process in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe right from the very beginning. 
The preferred investment region in the process was Eastern Central Europe, with the 
main focus on Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Multinational companies in 
particular are often present with large investment projects. A conspicuously strong 
interest is exhibited by the international auto industry. Germany's Volkswagen group 
has established a clear lead over the other major Western auto producers. This is both in 
terms of establishing production locations in all the countries of the region, and in being 
involved in especially large investment projects in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Slovakia, albeit to a lesser extent in the last-mentioned. In the decade since the opening 
up of Eastern Europe, auto industry investment in these countries has increased steadily 
and the flow of direct investment from this industrial sector still continues. 
The factor of foreign direct investment had, and still has, a major influence on industrial 
restructuring and general national economic development in the reform countries. 
Large-scale transfers of capital, know-how and management caused considerable 
dynamization of the transformation processes, contributing decisively to the countries' 
economic development. However, it has also led to a situation in which local and 
international companies have in effect formed separate industrial spheres exhibiting 
very divergent paths of development. This has resulted from both the large inflow of 
foreign direct investment and the very different equipping of the two spheres. In general, 
it can be said that a substantial development dynamism is visible and a high level of 
production modernization is present in that part of the industry where restructuring is 
being carried out with foreign direct investment. However, in the sector, where 
companies are carrying out operational structural conversion under their own steam, the 
restructuring process has clearly made less progress and the level achieved in many 
areas is still very low.
1 The two are significantly different in terms of competitiveness 
attained. In this respect, the discrepancy is clearly leaving its mark on the current 
industrial structure in the transformation economies. An internationalized, advanced 
economic sector is separated from one which, by comparison, lags substantially behind, 
remaining limited to regional or national dimensions. 
This phenomenon can be found frequently in Eastern Central European countries. It is 
mainly a result of asymmetric conditions arising from the transformation situation. 
These include dependency on external capital and know-how for the major restructuring 
step required and weak political governance.
2 It is a constellation which 
1  On the problem of discrepant development of strategic and defensive restructuring in general cf. 
Grosfeld/Roland 1996, Altmann 1997b. On operational restructuring in the Czech Republic in 
particular cf. Carlin et al. 1995, Myant et al. 1996. 
2  This weak political governance in the transformation countries is rooted in the radical change of 
system  affecting the political  and economic spheres simultaneously.  The unequal  speed of 
transforming these two subsystems, and in particular the much faster development of the -2- 
has brought about typical donor-recipient relationships. Where foreign direct investment 
is concerned, the hitherto dominant governance can be described as more a 
transformation-specific arrangement between the national government and a foreign 
industrial company, whereby the state participant's direct powers of control are limited, 
or are only exercised as such. The arrangement consists, for the most part, of exchanging 
investment and know-how for extensive exemption from general taxes and regulations. 
It is usually based on longer term commitments for jobs and further investment. This 
form of negotiating represents a kind of location pact, where the political participants 
give top priority to safeguarding the area as an industrial region. This prioritizing does 
not mean that the regional effect is being aimed for through spillover effects from 
foreign investment projects. Instead, priority is being given to internationalization for 
developing the location. This shift in priorities, from spillover policies to 
internationalizing in order to strengthen the region, is a remarkable phenomenon of 
restructuring. 
Such a location pact is mainly explained by unequal power relationships, but con-
sideration must also be taken here of the fact that the industrial structures in place only 
allow for limited connections. This aspect may also be one reason why a definite 
spillover policy for strengthening regional industry was basically not followed, with the 
inflow of investment instead forming the main point of orientation. This situation means 
that foreign investors are left to decide whether, and to what extent, they also build up 
relationships with local industry through their investment projects, and which spillover 
effects emanate from them to the region.
3 
However, the positive role apportioned to internationalization in the general economic 
development of transformation countries still says nothing about what contribution it 
makes in expanding restructuring skills at the location. This raises the question about 
which products are imported into the region with the foreign investment projects and 
which production structures arise. In other words, which old and new forms of 
specialization are generated and which possibilities ensue from them for also entering 
areas of higher value creation. This aspect of internationalization is crucial in deciding 
whether the transformation economies succeed in constructing a specific national pattern 
for international competition in particular 
economy often encountered, means that the respective political and legal institutions and regulations 
do not yet exist to an adequate extent, or are only partially effective. International organizations 
(OECD, EBRD) recently criticised this deficit, issuing warnings about good governance for the 
current second phase of transformation. This was meant not just in terms of an adequate system of 
rules for the economy, but above all with respect to legal institutions for implementing and 
controlling this set of rules (as reported in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung 12.5.1998 und 20.5.1998). 
3     No industrial policy regulations emerged among the countries in the region with the object of 
safeguarding economic expansion and their own industrial development. They function as individual 
entities, sometimes competing against each other where international organizations are concerned. 
The only exception is the CEFTA grouping, aiming at exchange relations between the countries 
themselves. Bearing in mind this situation, the question arises of how more-or-less balanced 
integration can be achieved for the region of Eastern Central Europe with these particularist interest-
group policies and the rather weak position of the countries. -3- 
segments. The consequence of all this is that internationalization must also be gauged 
primarily using this measure, in order to be able to assess the long-term consequences 
for the region and the industrial location. 
The main reason for this, is that it can be assumed that foreign investors looking to set 
up production in simple, labour-intensive areas will be attracted simply because of the 
powerful inducement of low wage costs in the countries. Traditional industrial mass 
production structures will be favoured as a consequence, following the old pattern of 
low cost/low skill/low tech production.
4 It is above all the aspect of low costs which will 
probably motivate a strong inflow of foreign direct investment. Viewed in this way, it is 
more doubtful that internationalization will strengthen the structures and skills which 
would ensure development paths with a real future for the national economies and thus a 
degree of autonomy. 
The region's general conditions of low labour costs, deregulation, and low political 
governance for foreign investors mean that it is clear that the direction of industrial 
structural development is determined extensively by the economic participants. 
Development is greatly influenced by large companies' strategies since they are 
decisively involved in the region's internationalization process.
5 
As for the European auto industry, far-reaching consequences can be reckoned with in 
the region of Eastern Central Europe. The sector has not only invested to an exceptional 
degree, but also symbolizes the increasing significance of Eastern Central European 
locations, a significance ensuing from far-reaching structural change in the industry 
linked with fundamental transformation of company structures which has been gathering 
momentum over the last few years. The region's specific options mean that development 
could move in a direction strengthening the locations in the qualitative respect named, 
provided account is taken of the industry's structural transformation where the matter of 
building up restructuring competence is concerned. Such a development represents a 
positive and important pacemaker function for an economic upswing in the eyes of the 
transformation economies. It is, however, hardly conceivable without problematical 
consequences for old locations in Western Europe. The strain deriving from the new 
locational competition and adding to growing pressure on social standards achieved in 
Western labour relations and concessions wrung from employees is becoming clear.
6 
The difficulties with internationalization described so far will now be discussed using 
evidence from two investment projects carried out by the Volkswagen group. The 
4
     As a guide in assessing the share of transfers from labour-intensive industries cf. Clement/Vincentz 
1997, p. 32. On the hitherto specialization on labour-intensive export goods cf. DIW 1997, pp. 85 
5
     Analysis of direct investment activity in Eastern Europe reveals that most of this is limited to a 
small number of major projects (Hübner 1996). 
6    This can be seen not just with moderate wage agreements, but also in particular with increased 
acceptance of much more flexible working hours. Employment and safeguarding a location are at the 
forefront here too and the margins for negotiating have narrowed considerably. For critical objections 
to this development tendency and the problem-solving capacity attributed to these strategies of 
increased flexibility cf. Zilian/Flecker 1998. -4- 
main emphasis here is on the matter of establishing skills operationally and on regional 
consequences emanating from these major projects. 
It can already be said in advance, that the developments set in motion represent a major 
growth in skills and made a substantial contribution to safeguarding the location. This 
conclusion has been reached on the basis of our operational studies in the companies in 
the Czech Republic and Hungary. Two aspects here are worthy of special mention. The 
first concerns the actions of the economic participants in a deregulated space, and the 
second the group's new strategy of standardization as a reaction to global competition. 
Where the first is concerned, it is remarkable that the internationalization projects were 
not separated from regional structures and knowledge resources. Instead they were 
deliberately linked up at the location with available local potential. One finding which, 
in our opinion, indicates a more recent element of internationalization, is the fact that 
such regional orientation came into being mostly without political regulation and that the 
group is not following any globalization strategy laying down a peripheral position for 
the new locations. This can be seen by the fact that when strong base institutions are 
present, the strategies are oriented toward them and location use does not occur in the 
form of over-use, something attributed in general to globalization strategies as is clear 
here, for example, with the potential of human resources in the area of technical skills. 
Although it cannot yet be assessed how far-reaching this phenomenon will become in 
global terms, it can still be ascertained that foreign and indigenous cultural assets have 
experienced a visible gain in importance in the economic players' strategies. More 
precisely, that they have been seen as a resource with the potential of an institutional 
comparative advantage.
7 
As for the second aspect, the standardization strategy, this has contributed to the Eastern 
Central European locations being strongly revalued in terms of their specific conditions 
as production sites in line with extensive standardization of products and processes, and 
the greater flexibility of production locations made possible by this. 
7     This point attracts, for the most part, little notice in analyses of globalization. Such shifts in 
importance in economic participants' strategic activities are mostly excluded or treated as an 
insignificant peripheral aspect in the face of a dominance of convergent development lines (cf. here 
Altvater/Mahnkopf 1997). It is something requiring clarification, even if it can only be mentioned in 
passing here. The universally low significance attributed to such institutional and culture-related 
actions by a participant seems to us to be accompanied by a very narrow understanding of regulation 
- an understanding which does not comprise an understanding of the weaker institutional or 
subinstitutional forms. In contrast, our observations suggest much more that precisely these forms are 
increasingly gaining in relevance. This is indicated in general by the emerging reform of 
responsibility for safeguarding interests between persons and institutions, and it is especially the case 
in situations of radical change as in Eastern Europe, where basic institutional structures are lacking, 
or only just in the process of being reconstructed. Finally, this is also indicated by recent cross-border 
activities, where joint institutional frameworks also had to be created anew. That is not to say that 
this type of action could replace formal regulatory institutions, it is rather that its significance in 
deregulation circumstances and its gain in importance in the new constellations should be stressed 
here. One thing which can be looked upon as a new feature in this context is that a clear interest has 
been formulated by the economic participants in establishing basic regulatory institutions for cross-
border activities in particular. -5- 
The forced restructuring in these investment projects and the new production concepts 
visible in a technical-organizational sense support this upgrading and have given the 
projects a kind of model function in the group. The projects can be seen as trend-setting 
for restructuring at group locations in the West, even if this can only be to a very limited 
extent because of the particularity of the transformation situation. 
The fact that production locations able to reach this position became established at the 
Eastern Central European sites can, in our opinion, be primarily attributed to the fact 
that options arose in line with standardization for these locations. This enabled the 
expansion of production concepts in connection with the given structure potentials, 
concepts seeing competition in terms of cost and quality as a competitive advantage in 
the long term. This alignment and evaluation may have played a decisive role in an 
internationalization strategy with greater regional integration taking effect in both 
projects. 
A somewhat closer look will be taken at the importance the region has gained because 
of its present continued advantageous constellation for foreign direct investment in 
particular, before dealing with the operational case studies of some of the development 
lines. 
2. The Region of Eastern Central Europe as a New Production 
Location 
The inflow of foreign direct investment since the opening up of Eastern Europe has 
remained far behind initial expectations and prognoses.
8 Not only that, regional 
distribution has also been very uneven. From the very start, the favoured investment 
region proved to be the region of Eastern Central Europe, with the Czech Republic, 
Poland and Hungary as the core countries.
9 Not only did these countries have an 
8        Cf. here DIW 1997,17; Jennewein 1996, 23. The average level achieved in the countries of Eastern 
Europe is approximately the same as in South America, and only half that which has so far poured 
into the East Asian growth region (Clement/Vincentz 1997, 32). One reason for this development 
could be that the anticipated success failed to materialize and the plans were not implemented to the 
extent foreseen. Possible explanations might include inexperience with internationalization, or the 
conception that production sites and operational institutions could be just simply transferred directly 
without needing any mutual adapting and consulting. This introduces the problem of the need to 
create an intercultural context based on mutual acceptance, something frequently papered over or 
underestimated in location strategies. Cf. Bolten 1995. 
9       Hungary has a leading position among the three countries, accounting for around 40%, or $17 
billion, of foreign direct investment flowing into Eastern and Central Europe by the end of 1997 
(Ost-West-Contact 2/1998, 47). The lead becomes far clearer if per capita distribution is taken into 
account. Hungary's $1,307 puts it well ahead of the Czech Republic ($712), followed at some 
distance by Slovakia ($147) and Poland ($142) (figures for end of 1996, Quaisser 1997, 11). The 
exceptionally clear preference for Hungary may be partly explained by the country's longer 
experience with economic liberalization, companies' greater familiarity with economic relationships 
with the country, and the very positive attitude of the political class towards foreign investment, 
something especially visible in its active incentive policy. Hungary is said to have the -6- 
above-average share of incoming direct investment, they also hosted a conspicuous 
number of major investment projects. This was even more remarkable because the 
region is only a comparatively small market.
10 This phenomenon makes it clear that the 
market argument was not the decisive factor and does not explain the large concentration 
of direct investment in the area. The attractiveness in this case originated far more from 
the region as a location. In other words, from structural conditions seen as advantageous 
when establishing new production locations. Even if the production location motivation 
was more important than that of the market in the decision to invest, an equally 
important role was played by the Eastern European market with its great future potential. 
This is especially the case here from the angle of safeguarding an early access to 
markets. 
Several factors are especially important in why the Eastern Central European region has 
become the preferred location for foreign investment. These include the triple 
constellation typical for transformation of very low costs in comparison with Western 
Europe, extensive deregulation, and national governments' policies on subventions and 
incentives. With the last-mentioned it can be said that basically all governments in 
transformation countries grant considerable preferential treatment and special conditions 
so as to support the inflow of foreign direct investment. The most common measures 
include tax relief and exemptions from customs.
11 The only exception in this respect so 
far has been the Czech Republic. Its economic policy generally did not foresee any 
direct subsidy measures for industrial operational development, and therefore, no special 
regulations for foreign investors.
12 Other 
greatest level of business confidence within Eastern Europe. Evidence of this is seen primarily in the 
advanced set of legal and institutional rules, as well as political stability and extensive privatization. 
As far as specific benefits are concerned, these are mainly the free trade zones provided in Hungary 
for Western investors. However, the latter are increasingly losing their attractiveness for Western 
European investors as harmonization with EU norms progresses (EIU 1997, pp. 60). 
10      Poland is the only country in the region with a market of any significant size. Its population of 
almost 40 million makes it four times as big as either of the other two countries. The larger market 
may explain why most of the big auto groups have chosen to locate there in particular. Further details 
about the auto industry in the region can be found later on in the study. 
11  A detailed overview can be found in DIW 1997, pp. 123. 
12     For a long time this form of transformation policy was considered to be the model for successful 
restructuring, enjoying international recognition because of good macro-economic development in 
the early years. The specific type of privatization used, known as the voucher method, meant that 
formal privatization was swiftly achieved. However it did not create the necessary structures or 
institutions for real corporate governance. In fact, the banking sector was not restructured for 
quite some time (Mertlik 1996, Altmann 1997a). This considerably slowed down developments for 
economic participants, companies and plants. The restructuring necessary just did not take place. 
The policy was oriented exclusively towards macro-economic aims, becoming famous under the 
neo-liberalist term: market economy without an adjective. It is linked with the name of Czech Prime 
Minister Vaclav Klaus (cf. for example the award conferred upon Klaus by Prognos, the renowned 
Swiss Economic Research and Strategy Advice Institute, and the recipient's speech in Barth 1996). 
Changes towards a policy taking more account of structural policy needs only started to become 
noticeable after the economic slump at the start of 1997 which had revealed the hitherto drastic -7- 
factors to be mentioned here include various forms of assistance and support 
programmes from the West. These are provided by international organizations such as 
the European Union or at national level, so as to jointly support the flow of investment 
into this region (Meißner 1997). The governments of the transformation countries grant 
additional special conditions, particularly for companies who establish themselves in the 
region with major investments and on whom hopes are pinned for extensive impulses 
which will be effective in the long-term for the economy as a whole and for industrial 
development. 
Undoubtedly, from an operational perspective, the central parameters motivating the 
establishment and switching of production locations into this region are the cost 
advantages from low wage levels and the greater scope for flexibility gained through 
deregulation. However, Western companies' preference for the region for new 
production locations also stems from another aspect, in this case a qualitative one. It lies 
in the region's structural profile. There are in fact several conditions which, from a 
business perspective, are considered good locational potential and which have 
increasingly come into focus in the wake of experience with investment projects in this 
region. The most significant factor is seen to be the fact that the countries of this region 
are relatively well developed industrial states with a broad spectrum of qualified and 
skilled workers. This is especially true for qualifications in the technical and engineering 
area and therefore for a sector of the employment market with a new and important 
function in modern industrial production. This structural potential means that the 
countries have at their disposal a resource distinguishing them from other regions of 
Eastern European transformation countries which are less industrially developed, but 
also from structurally weak regions of Western Europe. In this context it is significant 
that professionalism and good occupational training are highly valued in these countries' 
societal esteem, and that as a consequence there is an important industrial culture factor 
established, offering Western production projects good opportunities for finding a 
starting point.
13 
Other factors of advantage arising from the location also have to be taken into account 
in addition to this highly valued potential. One spatial factor is the region's geographical 
proximity to Western Europe, where most of the investment stems from. It is a factor 
which, technically speaking, gives the region the quality of a just-in-time-area especially 
when account is taken of the close interaction of intercompany relationships. An 
additional factor, this time cultural, is that there is already wide-scale knowledge of 
Eastern Europe, the languages, mentalities and practices: know-restructuring deficit at 
the enterprise level. A concomitant change in government was also associated with this 
change in policy. 
 
13     With reference to the importance of these competences, it is possible to observe specific shaping of 
mentalities, viewed negatively as socialist legacies. These, however, recede considerably into the 
background and are further modified by the investment in qualifications and further training made at 
these locations. Business representatives underline the view that, in particular, younger workers with 
professional training exhibit markedly high motivation. It is compared with an attitude similar to that 
found in the period of reconstruction in post-war West Germany. This is true to a lesser extent for the 
group of older workers who are offered fewer options by the new rebuilding efforts because of their 
vocational biographies. -8- 
ledge the companies and participants already possess because of earlier trade relation-
ships. It represents social capital, forming a competitive advantage for building up co-
operation and for further market development in Eastern Europe.
14 Finally, there is also 
the political factor, namely that of the structural rebuilding being continually pursued in 
these countries and the state of economic and political reforms so far achieved. Decisive 
here is the undisputed orientation towards the main underlying Western institutions of 
democracy and a market economy, and the political stability achieved in comparison 
with the transformation countries in Eastern Europe. At an early stage these countries 
had already earned the status of being the most advanced transformation countries where 
these reform aims were concerned. The positive evaluation of developments by Western 
transnational organizations such as the OECD and IMF has further strengthened this 
status. It is also expressed above all by the fact that the three countries are among the 
first from the circle of post-socialist reform states scheduled for membership in the 
European Union.
15 This option further strengthens the economic and political 
significance of the Eastern Central European region - especially as regards its location 
on the geographical and political link between Eastern and Western Europe. 
The constellation of comparative advantages which highlights the region of Eastern 
Central Europe arises from the link up between cost advantages, exhibited by 
transformation economies in Eastern Europe in general, and the specific qualitative 
structural characteristics of the countries in the region itself. This special feature may 
help explain why the direct investment activities of Western companies have so far been 
so strongly directed towards these countries. This does not necessarily imply that the 
skills available present are being used in such a way as to ensure positive structural 
development. Nevertheless, this phenomenon has contributed considerably to the 
national economies catching up with international developments within a very short 
space of time. 
A perspective going beyond that of the transformation countries alone reveals that this 
large dynamism is closely connected with the changes set in motion by economic 
globalization in the highly developed industrialized countries. For the high-cost regions 
in the West the main consequence of the global competitive situation is that these 
countries represent a new form of locational competition. A further increase in 
investment activities then followed at international locations with lower cost 
14   It has become generally recognized that old knowledge elites retain an important function in wide-  
      ranging restructuring processes in foreign cultural contexts. This knowledge represents an important  
      competitive advantage for investors especially with regard to constructing interplant relationships such  
      as with suppliers or institutes. The great continuity of old elites in leading company positions is one           
      piece of evidence for this situation (Szelenyi/Szelenyi 1995, Böröcz/Rona-Tas 1995). 
15    Apart from Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, the only other countries amongst the first group  
      of acceding countries for the expansion eastwards are Slovenia and Estonia. The absence of Slovakia  
      from this group despite similar economic data is mainly due to the lack of basic democratic institutions  
      and failure to attain a stable political system. At the end of 1992, after separation from the Czech  
      Republic, reform policies were not followed to the same extent and the country fell far behind its  
      neighbours (Rothacher 1997). -9- 
conditions in reaction to greatly increased cost pressure. This coincidence of transfor-
mation and globalization, restructuring requirements in Eastern Europe and increased 
establishment of production locations in lower cost regions meant that there was a 
constellation encouraging this favourable situation for the inflow of foreign capital into 
the Eastern Central European countries. 
3. The Auto Industry in the Process of Restructuring 
The international auto and components industry is one of the sectors which accounted 
for a very high proportion of foreign direct investment in the Eastern Central European 
countries in the early nineties. The large sum resulted mainly from a few major 
investments, in particular by the Fiat group in Poland and the Volkswagen group in the 
Czech Republic. VW is the largest investor in the region in terms of absolute 
investment.
16 The group's most prominent project is its participation in the Czech auto 
manufacturer Škoda. The latter functions as a manufacturing company maintaining its 
own separate brand within the group. The other VW projects are all plants with the 
status of group suppliers and assembly shops, although a comparatively large amount 
has also been invested here. In the meantime, it is clear that most leading auto groups 
are also represented with major investment projects, even if the amounts invested lag 
behind those of VW.
17 
Another regional feature also jointly and decisively influences investment decisions. As 
in the case of the other qualitative structural potentials dealt with, it is the presence of a 
broad basis of knowledge and competences in the auto production industry, alongside 
the other qualitative structural potentials named. The fact that this qualitative factor 
played an important role in the locational evaluation or choice of co-operating company 
can be seen with the regional distribution of investment projects, in other words with the 
overwhelming setting up at established old auto locations or locations with industries 
from related areas. This potential is strongest in the Czech Republic, or the former 
Czechoslovakia, being closely linked with the 
16    The investment programme up to the year 2002 envisages a sum of around $3.3 billion and is thus  
       considerably higher than the other major auto groups. Korean manufacturer Daewoo's investments  
       amount to ca. 2.0 billion (without Romania), Fiat 1.8 billion, and General Motors/Opel 1.2 billion.  
       These figures do not include the amounts invested by VW and GM in the former East Germany.  
       These are $1.8 billion (DM 3.2 billion) and 0.6 billion (DM 1 billion) respectively (cf. Financial  
              Times 13.2.1997). An overview of the figures for investment in the region made by the most   
       important groups can be found in the tables in the appendix at the end of the study. 
17    The main focus is formed by Western, or West European mass producers. It is remarkable, that no  
       Japanese group is represented apart from Suzuki in Hungary. Presumed reasons for this include their  
       preference for desert districts, in other words for locations without any old industrial structures and  
       no auto tradition (Havas 1995). This can also be read as an indicator of extensive implemention of the  
       distinct Japanese production and management model at international locations. -10- 
names of Škoda und Tatra.
18 The situation is somewhat different in Poland, where Fiat 
models have been produced under licence for decades. Hungary also has skills in this 
industrial sector at its disposal, though these are much more in the commercial vehicle 
industry and are linked primarily with the name of the bus manufacturer Ikarus and the 
engineering group Raba.
19 
The examples of the two companies Škoda-VW and FSM-Fiat make it especially clear 
that the factor of production competence in auto manufacturing has gained a great deal 
in importance. The fact that these two companies were chosen from a number of 
potential co-operation partners for the Fiat and Volkswagen groups after 1989 is also a 
result of the extensive mutual interest in maintaining existing competences and using 
them specifically for synergies. A relevant factor in the achievement of the cooperation 
project, which gave the groups concerned an advantage over their fellow competitors, 
was good knowledge of each other from long relationships in the case of FSM-Fiat, and 
an existing long-time mutual recognition of the companies in the case of Škoda-VW, in 
particular with respect to technical competence.
20 
A look at developments in industrial plant restructuring through foreign direct 
investment in this sector reveals the following interim picture. Apart from the 
production spectrum, complete manufacturing capacities can be found at Škoda in the 
Czech Republic, and FSM in Poland. In other words, those companies which already 
existed as manufacturing companies and which were to be kept as such with Western 
participation. Naturally, however, the link up of the company with the group and the 
latter's more recent centralization strategies were accompanied by a reorganization 
leading to a different weighting and distribution of the individual competence 
18     Škoda experienced enormous development in auto manufacture through its joint venture with VW.  
         Tatra, by contrast, has so far failed to attract an investor or suitable partner, seriously endangering  
         further maintenance of its auto manufacturing skills. The firm's financial difficulties have continued  
         even after its incorporation into the large engineering group Škoda Pilsen. Consequently, the board  
        of directors, under the leadership of Lubomir Soudek, the specially-appointed managing director, are  
        currently even considering shutting down the traditional area of operations of car production (Mlada  
         fronta Dnes 2.5.1998). 
19    The differences are explained not just by historically uneven traditions, but also above all by the  
        division of work between the countries of the old Eastern Bloc. These were based less on developed  
        structures and existing skills in the particular country, and much more on laying down industrial  
        specialization from outside. Czechoslovakia, in particular, was strengthened as an auto manufacturing  
        location by this policy, but Hungary experienced obstruction of its already-developing competences   
        in the auto components industry (Havas 1995). Major direct investment activities in the sector were  
        able to compensate for the enforced break in specialization and for hindered development, and core  
        activities again increased substantially thanks to their ability to catch up. 
20     In the case of Škoda, this recognition was mainly thanks to Carl Hahn, the then chairman of VW. It  
        was also reflected in his intensive commitment to precisely this object. It is not just a consequence of  
        strategic interests, but also, for the most part, a result of clear recognition of the long Czech auto  
        manufacturing tradition and the company's former leading position. (Cf. here the interview with Carl  
        Hahn carried out in connection with our research, 'Der Volkswagenkonzern und sein Engagement in  
        den Transformationsökonomien', Januar 1996, and Kellner 1993). On Fiat's participation with FSM  
        cf. Poznanska/Poznanski 1996, pp.74. -11- 
areas. Limitations arose from this in two aspects, at the company level, and from a 
regional perspective. In the former it was in the central area of activity of research and 
development, and in the latter, the decline in local content in the products.
21 
Other, new companies, with the status of manufacturing companies did not arise from 
these investments. The dominant type of investment project consists of establishing new 
companies, or joint ventures with existing companies which have the status of 
manufacturing facilities, functioning in this form as component manufacturers and/or 
assembly plants. A clear development of the sector with a components industry 
structural profile ensued in these countries as a result of integration into the international 
division of labour. In this respect, it is a continuation of national specialization patterns 
already in existence. However, in the face of continuing structural change in the auto 
and components industry it is still not clear which level of value-creation will be 
achieved here, and which upgrading or downgrading processes will result from it.
22 
The major presence of foreign direct investment from this sector is mainly a result of the 
phenomenon of specifically close manufacturer-supplier relations in the auto industry. 
As a consequence, the establishment of large Western manufacturing companies in 
Eastern Central Europe has had a kind of bandwagon effect and brought about a large 
inflow of direct investment from the area of the components industry. The causes of this 
are not just these just-in-time relationships, but also above all the massive cost pressure 
arising over the past few years which the supply industry was subject to. Against this 
background, it was precisely this industry which was increasingly dependant on 
locations in regions with low production and labour costs, and reacting more and more 
to this pressure with strategies of switching production. 
The strikingly dynamic development in the area of the components industry may also be 
partly due to the fact that the region of Eastern Central Europe offers competitive 
advantages in two ways. The structural constellation of qualified workers and low costs 
means it does not just compete with traditional low-wage countries like Spain and 
Portugal, but also in part with high-wage countries in Western Europe traditionally 
based on quality production.
23 
21
   This subject is treated at length in pan 4. 
22    Studies partly view the possibility of the industry advancing in a segment with more technically 
demanding products in a very positive light, provided these countries develop their export efforts 
(e.g. Inotai 1996). However, it must be mentioned here that the criteria of developing export 
structure is only partially appropriate as a form of proof since the criterion of how large the share 
of local added value there is in export products can only be assessed inadequately. This is because 
the more technically demanding products of foreign direct investment in particular often indicate 
a high proportion of upstream production. This touches upon a more general problem which is 
not just the case for transformation economies. Precisely in the highly internationalized auto 
industry, and in the face of a policy of global sourcing, it is clear that in general, the proportion of 
imported upstream production in the products is considerable and is continuing to grow. 
23
     This specific comparative advantage originally existed to the same extent in East Germany. The 
competitive factor disappeared following Germany's economic and monetary unification. The -12- 
The region's positive locational constellation for the inflow of foreign direct investment 
is, however, confronted with a development in the area of the auto and components 
industry which could cause considerable limitations for regional industry where 
improving specializations are concerned. The second large structural change in this 
industrial sector introduced at the start of the nineties brought profound changes in the 
form of production for the manufacturers, leading to tasks being reallocated between 
manufacturer and supplier. Complex production tasks were transferred to the supplier 
and relationships restructured as a consequence.
24 The manufacturers geared towards a 
few large suppliers instead of the hitherto large number of direct suppliers. The new 
higher demands were increasingly linked with developing competences. They also 
helped bring about a strong concentration process in the supply sector and to the 
establishment of group structures. This mainly affected the group of supplier companies 
belonging to the new area of system providers.
25 In the end this process led to a 
substantial accrued gain in highly value-added production in the components industry, 
but most of that fell upon the large providers. This new situation made a linking up with 
existing industrial structures in Eastern Central Europe very difficult. This, despite the 
fact that Western companies have greatly improved the conditions for producing high-
value products through their continued investment activity. It is fair to say that in view 
of this general structural change in the sector, the rise of the local components industry 
in areas of higher value-added production depends on how far international system 
suppliers fall back on regional industry for their upstream activities, or whether 
important competences remain primarily within the group set-up here too. 
4. Options and Barriers to Restructuring 
In the following section, two of the German Volkswagen group's investment projects, 
Škoda in the Czech Republic and Audi in Hungary, will be used as examples in setting 
out typical problems and constellations arising in the wake of the group's 
internationalization strategies and shaping structural development at the respective 
locations. The investment projects represent two very diverse groups of VWs inter-
nationalization strategy within which specific interests and motivational situations have 
emerged. In the case of the Czech company Škoda, the main motivation lay in securing 
broad access to the large new markets in Eastern Europe. Targeted 
continued very low level of investment activity in Eastern Germany compared with Eastern Central 
European countries is linked closely with this development. 
23     This rationalization process is based on a technical innovation, modular manufacturing. It enables      
        the production process to be split up into larger, independent production units. Through this the  
        manufacturing of these units can now be carried out relatively independently from each other. It also  
                made it possible to remove major production tasks or to transfer them to the supplier. On the   
        problems of reorganizing the auto industry cf. Hancke 1997. 
24    On the concentration process in the components industry cf. Hagele/Schön 1998, Süddeutsche   
        Zeitung  8.5.1998 -13- 
participation in Škoda meant participating in the manufacturing company with a 
traditionally leading position in the region. As a result, not only was a near monopoly in 
the Czech Republic ensured, but also a presence in the Eastern European markets 
already served by the old company, together with a strategic advantage over 
competition. This investment project was based on a strategy of expansion. 
In Hungary, the motivation for investing in the establishment of a manufacturing facility 
for Audi motors was completely different. The regional market played a negligible role 
in this case. The group's interest was directed far more towards the production location 
and its comparative advantages.
26 The investment project was closely connected with 
fundamental, wider-ranging reorganization of core competences within the group set-
up.
27 In contrast to the Czech case, the Hungarian investment type is that of a strategy of 
relocation. Investment here initially occurred in the wake of an expansion in capacity, 
however, thus having a less serious negative impact on the German locations.
28 
The various alternative models within VWs internationalization strategies accordingly 
result from varying initial constellations. A joint venture with the perspective of a take-
over was the objective in the case of Škoda, but with Audi it was purely a greenfield 
investment. Škoda is a manufacturing company with proven independence towards the 
group, whereas the newly constructed Audi factory possesses only very limited 
autonomy as a supplier operation for the group. There are corresponding differences in 
the respective site management's scope in restructuring. Naturally, the initial situation 
and developed structures meant that there were far greater pressures to adapt in the 
Czech joint venture than in a new company in a rural area where production and 
organization had arisen completely from scratch and a totally new workforce had been 
recruited. The characteristics of both investment projects outlined also make it clear that 
they differ greatly in their effects on their surrounding regions. In the greenfield 
production example these are mostly restricted to the operational area, thanks in part to 
its strong integration into the group's 
26     The fact that Hungary was chosen by VW out of 180 international locations in a bench-marking 
evaluation underlines the significance of the region's special constellation of advantages. Generous 
policies of state subsidies and incentives for foreign investors increased the Hungarian site's 
attractiveness still further. 
27      The VW group reacted to structural change in the auto industry by enforcing technical innovation as 
pan of its general cost-lowering strategy. For the purposes of implementation this innovation was 
given the title of platform strategy or equal parts policy. It aimed towards greater product 
standardization and was mainly linked with wide-ranging redistributing of responsibilities and 
competences within the group set-up. 
28      Favourable conditions at the Hungarian scheme meant that a compromise capable of winning 
support was reached between the company panics. In this compromise, it was possible to establish a 
link between locational reconstruction and safeguarding the location. It was agreed that around one 
third of the almost $120 million (DM 210 million) saved on costs would be allocated for investment 
and production modernization at the German location (cf. interview with Riester 1996). -14- 
overall production. However, in the joint venture case, these extend beyond the 
production site and also benefit regional industry. 
a) Transfer and Production Strategies 
One characteristic common to both projects is that in neither case did Volkswagen 
simply transfer an existing model for restructuring and constructing sites from another 
location. Rather, its strategy was aimed towards modernizing production at the Czech 
and Hungarian locations to a greater extent than at any of its sites in the West. It was a 
strategy based on its new basic principles and models. Structures were set up relying on 
close linkage between the available potentials on site and new demands arising from the 
globalization process. Consequentially, the basic principles of decentralized 
organization were introduced in both companies with more local responsibility at the 
production level, alignment towards staff abilities and competences, smaller chains of 
authority, co-ordination and leadership based on communication, and group and team 
structures. Naturally, both strategies differ in their actual layout. Two factors are 
primarily responsible for this. First, the characteristic feature of the respective strategy 
already outlined: constructing a new engine plant as a group supplier versus 
reconstructing and extending an existing brand name company for the East European 
market. Second, different possibilities opened up for using new forms of organization. 
With the Hungarian greenfield investment, the emphasis was on changing the 
organizational relationships within the plant, but in the Czech joint venture it was much 
more on developing intercompany organizational relationships. The characteristic 
features of both strategies will now be expounded further using the case studies. 
Audi: The production strategy followed with the Hungarian engine plant can be 
considered to be very far reaching in terms of implementing key lean-production 
principles. Its decisive elements are radical decentralization, with just two hierarchical 
levels remaining, and a consistent shift of industrial management directly into the area 
of production. The new strategy places high demands at the level of production 
processes both on the breadth of specialist knowledge and on transdepartmental co-
ordination. The central structural element is the newly-created leading role of production 
manager, someone who must combine good engineering qualifications with quasi 
entrepreneurial responsibility for the respective production unit.
29 New forms of self-
regulation and participation at the level of the production worker were also introduced, 
including above all, group and team discussions, covering technical-specialist, 
organizational and staff problems. One of the basic improvements in this 
29   Engineers with university qualifications, in particular from mechanical engineering, were consistently  
      recruited for this first hierarchy level in production. The provision for entrepreneurial decision-making  
      responsibility can be seen in the direct control over a local budget for smaller investments - e.g. buying  
      tools, minor staff and production requirements, and direct implementation of improvement suggestions  
            as part of the idea management strategy. The guiding principle of the "businessman-on-site"   
      (Unternehmer vor Ort) was coined for the responsibility and independence of this role. On the early  
      evaluation and identification with the new entrepreneurial employee role cf. Kessel/Dörr (1998). -15- 
respect is the introduction of participative management with the key element of 'target 
setting'. In this way, targets for production and performance are no longer set 
unilaterally by managers invested with the power to define and direct, as was previously 
the case, but are instead open to negotiation within a given framework. This aspect of 
leadership places performance steering on a communicative basis with the aim of 
replacing external checks with self-regulation. It is a development marking a new switch 
in the form of regulating working process and working relationships.
30 
Characteristic of this strongly decentralized communication-based model is explicit 
alignment towards qualifications and production skills, and so to a resource readily 
available in the region.
31 Undoubtedly, the implementation of this production model was 
also aided by the very low wage levels in general, allowing use of, for the most part, 
skilled and highly qualified workers. However, another structural characteristic arose 
from the low-cost scenario: a much lower level of automation in comparison with the 
West. The obvious advantages, from the company's point of view, lie not just in lower 
capital and investment costs, but also primarily in greater flexibility, easing the many 
conversion steps arising from ever-shorter product life cycles and considerable product 
diversification, and accommodating the requirements of efficient customer-oriented 
manufacturing.
32 However, this low level of automation has also meant that very 
monotonous and restrictive working requirements exist in areas where the most simple 
mechanical procedures and functions occur - such as assembly. In this respect, the new 
production model exhibits a dual structure, with areas of highly qualified skilled work 
and technically highly qualified engineering staff located alongside areas where the 
simplest of tasks were carried out. This constellation can be considered characteristic for 
the new production strategies in the transformation 
30   This change follows on from the replacement of monitoring by superiors with technological 
monitoring. Both forms should certainly be seen under the aspect of increasing performance by 
disciplining staff. However, self-regulation is also intended to create space for bringing in individual 
creative potential. On the switch to technology-based surveillance cf. Dörr 1991. There Js a wide 
range of assessments of the ambivalence of the autonomy gained through self-regulation in 
decentralized organizations. Recent studies taking a particularly critical line on the social 
consequences of increasing flexibility and the new form of control include those by Sennett (1998) 
and Deutschmann (1989). The latter specifically relates this to new management roles. The positive 
line associates the greater responsibility and participation with an approach placing the issue of 
democracy in the field of production, cf. Dörre (1996), Müller-Jentsch (1994). 
31      The clearest indicators are the polytechnic and university institutes present in the region, indicating 
a clear specialization in the area of engineering. This is mainly in connection with the universities in 
Budapest and Miskolc, and also the polytechnic in the industrial town of Györ in western Hungary. 
The linkage between industry (mechanical engineering) and polytechnic forms a core resource for 
the location, something benefiting the regional job market. 
32    The automation of production forced through in the 1970s is generally evaluated as over-using 
technology and hindering flexibility. It is considered to be a central impediment in restructuring in 
the auto industry in the former West Germany, frequently being blamed for slow conversion and 
delayed adaptations (cf. i.a. Lutz 1997; Jürgens/Lippen 1997). -16- 
countries of Eastern Central Europe. It turned out to be a problem where highly-skilled 
and trained employees were deployed for extremely undemanding tasks.
33 
It would seem that an important course has been set if one assesses the production and 
work structures which have arisen in the Hungarian company in terms of their 
continuing development opportunities and taking account of the below-average level of 
automation in comparison to Western standards, the extensive reorganization, and the 
specific orientation towards skilled work. This course makes the new location 
particularly suited to technically demanding products and production processes as 
well.
34 
Škoda: the new production form of modular manufacturing formed the basis of the 
guiding principle for restructuring in the case of the Czech joint venture.
35 Naturally, 
where the old structures were concerned, it could only be implemented gradually into 
the organization. Simultaneously, the assembly structures were completely 
reconstructed according to this modular principle in the wake of large expansion 
investment. The investment was also aimed at expanding the product range. This 
synchronized "two-step" made it possible to link up with existing structures and 
competences in the restructuring process whilst simultaneously forcing their further 
development. A twofold stabilization of the company was aimed for by linking the 
modernization of existing production organization with product innovation. The short-
term aim was to switch quickly to international minimum standards, especially in terms 
of product quality. In the longer term, the aim was to harmonize with the VW group 
standards, so increasing Škoda' s international competitiveness for Western markets 
too.
36 
33    The discrepancy between demands and vocational qualification was, on the whole, negatively 
assessed in our interviews, but generally accepted thanks to the lack of alternatives. What emerged 
was the high importance attached to career and work, and the interest in retaining competences 
gained. In this respect, the unhappiness and latent tensions which were expressed were not primarily 
due to material reasons, but more the threat to career-cultural identities. Positive points attributed to 
the job included above-average wages for the region, the opportunity to get to know state-of-the-art 
production methods, both technical and organizational, and getting to know internationally 
recognized standards regarded as being beneficial for professional development. 
34    Further expansion of the factory extends beyond the plan for a location for motor production to 
include vehicle assembly for a new product. Other measures currently being discussed include 
locating research and development capacities at the Hungarian site. 
35     This form of production organization has become known under the name of fractal factory. A core 
section of this is the integration of external firms (suppliers) into the manufacturing company's 
production process. However, this model of 'firms within a firm' conflicts with the German system of 
co-determination which was geared towards the factory as a homogenous unit. This is because the 
fractal factory model tends to dissolve this structure and limit the area of applicability of operational 
co-determination. On this subject cf. Streeck (1996). In this respect, this point indicates a barrier to 
the Škoda model's transferability to German locations. 
36     Until then the Škoda company was only represented in the small car segment. The joint venture 
means that a second series of models has now been developed, located in the medium class. 
Expanding the product range was seen as a strategic necessity following the decision to retain Škoda 
as a company with its own name. This was because of the need to be able to survive under conditions 
of global competition in the car markets. For the Škoda management, the critical size -17- 
A key aspect of the new production strategy is reorganizing manufacturer-supplier 
relationships. Following this strategy, the most important supplier firms are no longer 
located just in the region or in the same locality, as was assumed until now under the 
just-in-time premise, but are instead in the company itself and directly integrated into 
the production process in accordance with just-in-sequence delivery. In this way, the 
structure follows the new principle of maintaining maximum spatial-temporary linkage 
of supplier and manufacturer. It is open to dispute how far this model of "enterprises 
within an enterprise" will remain restricted to being a path for radical transformation 
contexts or will experience further expansion. There are strong doubts, not just in terms 
of the social and institutional implications, but also because of the risks associated with 
close linkage and dependence which impede broader implementation. 
If one assesses the restructuring process at Škoda in relation to its consequences then a 
concept emerges linking the new form of production organization with product 
innovation and a far-reaching reorganization of intercompany relationships. As a 
consequence, the firm has not just been able to defend its traditional leading position in 
Eastern Europe, but also achieved good new positioning in important Western markets. 
It is true that co-operation has caused the limitations in areas of competences outlined 
(e.g. research and development), nevertheless, maintaining all key company functions is 
a remarkable result. To this extent, this is an example in which group participation has 
contributed to strengthening independence, rather than reducing the backward Czech 
company to being a junior functional unit. 
b) Governance and Spillover Effects 
A comparison of the two investment projects to assess which spillover effects emanate 
from them to regional industry and how far an active governance based on industrial 
policy can be seen, provides the following picture: 
Governance: The Czech manufacturing company which has extensive exchange 
relationships, possessed its own network of suppliers and had been firmly anchored in 
the region for a long time. The question of regional integration was an important point 
in the political negotiations about the joint venture thanks to this structure and the strong 
position of the company in the national economy. In contrast to this case, the Czech 
government did not as a rule develop special packages of incentives for foreign direct 
investment - unlike its counterparts in the other transformation countries. The extent to 
which Czech industry as a whole was linked with this major enterprise, and the object's 
resulting industrial-political significance, is underlined by the role played here by the 
regional components industry in negotiations on cooperation. The Czech aim was clear, 
to obtain an undertaking to retain the company's status and its name. The fact that they 
achieved their aim is not just thanks to the fact that this was a fundamental demand, but 
is also explained by the uniqueness of the object and the great strategic significance the 
German investor placed on it for 
for this was represented by a variance of three series of models (deputy chairman Detlef Wittig 
quoted in Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2.6.1998). -18- 
the new East European market. In that respect, this really is an exceptional case in 
investment policy terms - both with the Czech policy towards direct foreign investment 
and the commitments achieved.
37 
In the Hungarian Audi engine plant project, tying the company in with the region's 
existing industrial structures was not a distinct matter for negotiation and the planned 
investment's realization was not linked with any specific condition. A look at the 
Hungarian governance with respect to foreign direct investment indicates that the case 
hardly differs from other major investments. The government's interest was primarily 
directed towards the inflow of direct investment, explaining the very extensive policy of 
incentives and subventions together with the great scope available to foreign investors. 
Consequently, there are two main reasons why relevant spillover effects are hardly 
noticeable in the Audi project. It is partly because there are no supplier structures, and 
partly because the internationalization project is very closely linked with existing 
supplier relationships within the group in this case. Hungary confirmed this exclusively 
transnational orientation and strengthened it still further by granting the company a 
duty-free area for its necessary cross-border transactions. 
Against such a background, no major spillover effects could have been expected for 
local industry. However, the Hungarian side did perceive it as a long-term possibility for 
helping further specialization in vehicle construction, and so towards strengthening a 
key industrial sector in a country which, until now, has only seen development in the 
commercial vehicles sector. As regards governance, the Hungarian case shows that the 
political player hardly made an explicit assertion to the major investor of it's own 
industrial policy interest in securing spillover effects for the region. However, a positive 
balance can be seen, despite the Hungarians' substantial concessions on industrial 
policy. It results mainly from the group's intention to reinvest at the new location in the 
long run. Knock-on effects for regional industry have so far been minimal. Nevertheless, 
this major project is rated very positively because of the jobs created and above all for 
the signal effect which radiated from it to other investors. Seen in this way, it has made 
a significant contribution to developing regional restructuring skills, albeit more 
indirectly. 
Spillover Effects: The Czech case is of special interest where spillover effects are 
concerned, and so worth in-depth consideration. A considerable number of Western 
supplier firms have located in the Czech Republic in the wake of VW's investment 
activities.
38 The Škoda board initiated intensive efforts to find Western co-operation 
37     On the type of regulation cf. Zemplinerova (1994), on the decisions in the Czech Republic cf.  
          CzechInvest  (1998),  on  the  actual  agreements about the Škoda-VW joint venture cf.   
          Schomer/Herkenhoff (1994, p. 235-238). 
38       According to the latest figures, almost a fifth of all foreign direct investment in the Czech Republic  
         up until the end of 1997 flowed into the auto industry (cf. CzechInvest 1998, Pomery 1997, p. 13).  
         It must however be stressed that in the initial phase the share was actually much higher, mainly  
         because of VW's investment, accounting for almost a quarter of direct investment (cf. Ost-West- 
         Contact 4/1996, pp. 30). This clearly indicates, that the auto industry is the most important key  
         industry in the Czech Republic in which the supply industry accounts for a high proportion. On  
         investment activity in the components industry cf, EIU (1997, 21), -19- 
partners for the most important suppliers. Its motivation in doing so was to force 
through the necessary structural conversion and competence extension at the domestic 
companies in order to achieve the required international quality standards in a short 
period of time.
39 One example of this is the way the company set up a training and 
further training programme for Czech supplier companies, and in so doing carried out its 
own form of know-how transfer. Ultimately, Škoda's extensive commitment in the area 
of the components industry derives from the site management's own determined self-
interest in being able to make comprehensive use of the region's cost advantages, not 
just in its own manufacturing but also via a high proportion of local sourcing. Another, 
more politically motivated factor for actively setting up suppliers was the stagnation of 
the manufacturing restructuring process associated with the Czech privatization method 
and the resulting precarious situation of domestic companies.
40 In view of this difficult 
situation, a strong interest in creating a stable and competitive environment of suppliers 
developed in the newly reorganized Škoda company, in order to protect as well as 
possible against the negative consequences of this delayed transformation.
41 
The dynamic development in local industry also initially sparked off by the joint venture 
with VW can be seen as a relevant spillover effect from this major investment.
42 
However, the positive balance from the starting phase did not continue throughout the 
joint venture. One main reason for this reduction was to be found in the structural 
change the auto industry went through and the strategies developed by group 
management in reaction to it. It was not just the production processes which were 
completely transformed by this, but also manufacturer-supplier  relationships. Škoda 
experienced major limitations to utilizing supplier structures at the Czech location in 
particular, experiencing a drastic reduction in local content as a result. This was mainly 
caused by the radical cost-cutting strategy, with its two core 
39    In the first years of reconstruction, the board was led by two people who were experts on East 
European industrial structures and who succeeded in pushing through the setting up of a regional 
components industry for Škoda. On the Czech side, there was a representative from the auto 
components industry, and on the German side, a long-standing representative of the group in Eastern 
Europe. Thanks to these two, the problem of supplies was allocated a high priority in restructuring. 
40     One key problem arose from coupon privatization. It did not lead to effective corporate governance 
and prevented the establishment of one of the most important entrepreneurial institutions (Altmann 
1997a, pp.39). This situation helped cause the country's biggest economic crisis at the start of 1997 
and seriously put back the transformation process. 
41     At an early stage, operational experts in particular had already evaluated the Czech transformation 
process as being very difficult in terms of the domestic companies' competitiveness and forecast a 
crisis. From an operational perspective, the assessments about the level achieved and the 
development of the Czech transformation process stood in clear contradiction to the generally very 
positive assessment of the country from a macro-economic perspective, with it long being viewed as 
an example of successful transformation. 
42      As a direct result, some 70 Western supplier firms located in the Czech Republic, around 50 in the 
form of joint ventures and 20 as greenfield investments. These delivered ca. 50% of upstream 
activities in the production of the joint venture's first new model series, the small car Felicia 
(CzechInvest 1996, p. 9). -20- 
elements of centralizing all the group's purchasing and standardising key product 
components.
45 The effect of extensive restructuring undertaken at all group companies 
was especially noticeable for the Czech subsidiary. These effects were, however, both 
positive and negative. 
Undoubtedly, the positive side for Škoda comprised of the products' high quality leap 
following the transfer of group know-how. This tremendously improved the image of 
the Czech product name and gave a substantial boost to its international competitive-
ness. Visible evidence of this includes continuously rising sales figures and the com-
pany's increasing presence in Western markets too.
44 This brought further economic 
stabilization for Škoda, and it is now the most important company in the Czech 
economy in terms of turnover and exports.
45 The negative side lies mainly in the fact 
that Škoda can no longer use the location's comparative advantages (i.e. local sourcing) 
to the same extent, and that important research and development competences have been 
transferred to the group following on-site standardization.
46 The negative points have far 
greater significance as far as their effects on the regional economy are concerned. 
Prospects of participating in the manufacturing company's upsurge there have lessened 
after the marked reduction in the utilization of the Czech components industry. 
In connection with this, a further factor has come into play here arising from the new 
forms of production. Development has been strengthened by structural change in the 
components industry, in the course of which a few larger system suppliers have evolved. 
At Škoda, too, the new production concept of the fractal factory was linked with 
focussing supplier relationships on such system suppliers. However, this function will 
now be taken over by large international group companies, located directly on site by 
Škoda and closely integrated into the production process. Whether 
43     Whereas the local content share of the product was still ca. 70% in the beginning, it was down to ca. 
40% by the time the group's platform strategy had been implemented (Mladá fronta Dnes 2.9.1996). 
44
     Of a total production of around 357,000 vehicles, 70% were exported. The most important West 
European markets include Germany, Italy, and Britain, with a share of over 20%. Production has 
risen very rapidly over the last three years with annual rates of between 20 and 35% (cf. Škoda 
annual report 1997, Financial Times 3.2.1998). 
45     Škoda accounted for around 8% of the Czech Republic's total exports in 1997 and doubled its 
turnover from the previous year to ca. $2.5 billion (cf. Škoda annual report 1997) 
46     This was caused by reducing vehicle platforms from 16 to just 4 and the concomitant centralizing of 
research and development for this part of the product . VW and Audi have responsibility for the two 
new platforms. It is still unclear how much responsibility in this section will be regained by the 
group's two smaller companies, Škoda and Seat. However, it is planned that each company label 
should be responsible for one platform. Cf. VW board member responsible for development Martin 
Winterkorn in: Automobil-Produktion 10/1997, pp. 22. This negative point would have to be 
modified if it really were to be implemented. -21- 
relevant spillover effects for local industry can still be expected will depend on the 
relative scope for activity and restrictions the companies have as system suppliers.
47 
Even if a rise in status to being a system supplier for the Czech components industry is 
hardly achievable for domestic companies in the short term and without foreign direct 
investment, this still does not mean that none of them can develop into being suppliers 
for system components. This is because the new modular construction method is such 
that more complicated building components no longer have to be stored on site. The 
manufacture of technically challenging products could also be transferred here against 
this background, bearing in mind the cost advantages of the Eastern Central European 
region in global locational competition, advantages which are likely to continue for 
some time. Viewed from the perspective of the Western European locations, this is 
something which represents a definite danger of reducing skills and cutting jobs, but for 
the components industry in the transformation countries it represents far more an 
opportunity of moving up into a segment with greater value creation. 
5. Conclusions 
At the present point in time, one conclusion is at least certain in any overall assessment 
of the influence the two investment projects dealt with in this study have exerted on 
developments on operational restructuring competences in the Czech Republic and 
Hungary: In both cases structures were drawn up which have established a strong 
competitive position for the companies. This makes it clear, that the dominant strategies 
here were not in fact the pattern of the extended workbench. In other words, they were 
not the dominant type of globalization strategies, which have often been prophesied for 
less-developed regions.
48 It is rather the case that companies arose with structures and 
products, firms which could prove themselves as manufacturing operations with 
complicated technology and also with suitably qualified people. It might generally be 
true for less-developed regions that the globalization process reinforces the differences 
between rich and poor regions rather than contributing to a balanced diffusion (cf. 
Boyer/Drache 1996), but as has been shown, this is conditionally the case for Eastern 
Central Europe. The alternative development path can primarily explain why the Eastern 
Central European type of a 
47      We have no clear information on this question. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that the effects are 
more likely to be low because of the generally observable high import ratio for foreign investment 
projects in manufacturing industry (cf. Pomery 1997, pp. 21). 
48    The image originates in a general view in which the developed Western industrial societies function 
as a model allocated a permanent pioneer role. This self-image has, if anything, been strengthened by 
the events of 1989. The feeling of superiority has not least meant that the pending fundamental 
restructuring requirements have been allowed to be pushed into the background; the transformation 
countries' weaker position was considered to be a permanent fact. Warnings are increasingly being 
made in the meantime to depart from this way of thinking (cf. Lepenies' call (1997) for a stronger 
attitude more capable of learning in societal exchange relationships). -22- 
"backward" economy examined here nevertheless has a strong institutional and 
structural framework (above all a good education system and an industrial specialization 
base) which enable later upgrading. The fact that these potentials are also used by 
economic players in the extensively deregulated space supports the thesis expounded at 
the beginning about the increasing significance of the "cultural-institutional factor" in 
the economic players' activity, an increase in significance not simply due to the civil 
aspect, but also resulting from the economic revaluation of these potentials under the 
new competitive conditions. 
The dominant characteristic of the newly-constructed organizational structures is the 
strong orientation towards qualifications and work (as opposed to technology) and so a 
reduced level of automation. The structural constellation of the regional advantages is 
reflected in this. The production concept draws its great flexibility from this linkage and 
so an important competitive advantage over the group companies in the West. 
An important restriction to this finding must, however, be emphasized. It may be that the 
decentralized production concept in the technical production has improved the skilled 
workers' and engineers' job specifications, but this is only true to a limited extent for 
manual production and even less so for the broad area of assembly.
49 Here, the same 
constellation of advantages has led to a situation in which the level of automation has 
remained far below the possibilities and standards achieved in the West.
50 The partially 
high degree of process standardization may be provided with a counterbalance through 
the decentralized self-regulating structures, but the requirements for expert skills remain 
very limited in these areas. 
On the whole, it is noticeable that in terms of the current key factor of quality standards, 
the investment projects have been successful with the operational expansion of skills. It 
is indisputable that the transfer of know-how from the group played a major role in this 
success. There is also no doubt that important preconditions were present at the new 
locations. The firms are looked upon as pioneers beyond just the region itself. 
Nationally they are also seen as substantial economic factors. Moreover, they were also 
able to cement their position within the group. The most visible expression of this 
favourable position is the considerable expansion investment planned by the group at 
the new location.
51 The extent to which this investment strengthens the option for 
expanding competences in areas and processes with higher value-creation in particular is 
strongly linked with developments at the 
49  It may be that a great difference is observable between manufacturing and assembly in the new  
     organizational forms in terms of skilled processes and room for manoeuvre. It must be underlined that      
     this is not a specific phenomenon of Eastern locations, but is just as likely to be found in the group  
     work model at Western sites (cf, Schumann/Gerst 1996). 
50   How drastic the differences can be is shown, for example, by the Slovakian location where the level  
     of automation is not above 30-35%, making it the lowest in the whole group (cf. Volkswagen director  
     Folker Weißgerber in: Automobil-Produktion 10/1997, p. 56). 
51   In both projects the initial investment programmes were increased substantially. In Škoda's case from  
     $ 2.1 billion (1994) to $2.5 billion up to the year 2002. With Audi, the rise was from $400 million  
    (1994) to $467 million up to the year 2000 (figures from Škoda and Audi). -23- 
locations in the West, because the projects' strong upsurge cannot be seen separately 
from the positive market development the VW group has been experiencing since 
mastering its crisis (at the start of the 90s). Until now, favourable economic conditions 
ensured that both projects were tied into the context of capacity expansion, and in 
Škoda's case, linked more with positive feedbacks for the group's companies in the 
West. This is only partially true with Audi's engine plant in Hungary. It may well be that 
its establishment was linked with product innovation, so allowing the project to be 
considered an expansion measure, but in the longer term, the new manufacturing may be 
able to replace the old products, possibly leading to a shifting of competences. So far, 
the restrictions for the German locations remained moderate only because development 
was closely linked with the group's upsurge. The situation is a consequence of the 
favourable business situation. Critical factors in its further continuation include the 
ability of the group to continue to maintain its position in the face of worldwide 
overcapacity, and the choice of location for cutbacks if the occasion should arise. 
If one assesses developments from the angle of the consequences for Eastern Central 
Europe as an industrial location, then positive impulses have emanated from both 
investment projects for industrial specialization. In Škoda's case, the existing strong 
pattern of auto production specialization was cemented and developed further through 
the process of internationalization. With Audi, the investment project represented an 
important step for establishing regional competences in the car industry, a sector 
underdeveloped in Hungary to date. Moreover, the Eastern Central European locations 
experienced a general revaluation thanks to the successes outlined. The signal and 
demonstration effect emanating from both restructuring projects to further direct 
investment in the region is not insignificant. The two also share the same decisive marks 
of success, the innovative implementation of the new production concepts and their 
ability to link up with existing specialization profiles. As a result, they both stand for 
new locational strategies specifically linked with qualitative structural potentials, albeit 
in different ways. 
The effects the investment projects had on local industry are, by contrast, less positive, 
as has been illustrated. The limited spillovers have undoubtedly helped widen the gap 
which has arisen between international and local companies. It is currently impossible to 
see how far this deficit is simply an effect emanating from the starting phase which will 
decline over time. This division of industry into two very unequally developed areas 
which has occurred is seen critically from the perspective of the national economies. It 
resulted, however not just from the group strategies but also from the very weak 
industrial and structural political governance of the transformation countries.
52 The 
precariousness of these consequences of separation can be 
52   In general, governance is seen as pragmatic and defensive in this point in the transformation   
     countries. For the most part, structural policy is limited to the respective privatization policies and their  
     consequences. These are seen as ranging from structural-policy-neutral to structural-policy-inspired   
     (cf. Lageman 1997, p. 253). This form of governance is explained by the particular conditions of the  
     old system's collapse. It was also, however, a firm leading principal in politics - as in the case of the  
     Czech Republic -24 - 
seen, for example, in the migration into the internationalized area by the most important 
sections of the workforce, and of highly qualified skilled workers in particular, (cf. 
Myant et al. 1996, p. 169). If this trend continues, and key actors are no longer available 
to help in restructuring the already weakened local industry, then that will undoubtedly 
worsen its chances still further of making up ground in the economic development 
process. 
Even if our preliminary conclusion about the first phase of transformation indicates a 
much better result at the operational level than at the regional, the overall view is still 
positive. The internationalization process in the auto industry has set the course for 
development allowing the transformation economies to expect to attain a good middle 
ranking in the international division of work - provided the transition to more 
technically demanding products really does occur and the disparities mentioned can be 
limited. This cautiously optimistic prognosis leads, however, to a critical point from a 
Western European perspective. It cannot be ruled out that further upward revaluation of 
Eastern Central European countries as production locations might possibly cause a 
switching and withdrawing of skills from the old Western locations. This tendency can 
be relied upon to gain momentum for reasons other than just cost. These include the fact 
that the number of regions offering high-skill qualifications at low-cost conditions has 
increased markedly, and because the possibilities for a technically challenging 
production are no longer just limited to high-cost regions in the West. 
As a result, however, the new context of internationalization also raises the question of 
restructuring competence and governance in a further dimension which also needs to be 
understood. It is no longer just related to the transformation economies, i.e. to 
establishing and further developing skills, as was the case so far in this study. 
Governance and restructuring competences are, rather, also increasingly in demand for 
the developed industrial regions in the West and they must gear themselves towards 
restructuring skills with the aim of maintaining them. The restructuring difficulties in 
this double perspective make it clear, that governance geared solely towards a national 
framework is no longer sufficient to cope with the interactions and consequences. It is 
clear that what is required is a form of governance systematically incorporating the 
international factor into national policies in order to support an institutional linkage for 
the new transnational processes. This means that basically a form of industrial-
ecological governance is needed. It would be invested with the task of combining the 
aim of maintaining space and resources at the old industrial locations with the 
development perspective of other regions. This would be a form of controlled 
internationalization, allowing both opportunity and restriction in equal measure, and 
counteracting the potentially ruinous effects of locational competition. -25- 
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Appendix: Auto Groups' Investment in Eastern Central Europe 
Table 1: 
Investment by Group: 
 
Group  Countries  Planned Investment (up to 
2002, in $) 
VW 
Daewoo 
Czech Rep./ Poland/ Hungary/ 
Slovakia Poland  3.3 billion 
2.0 billion 
FIAT  Poland  1.8 billion 
GM/ Opel/ Isuzu  Poland/ Hungary  1.2 billion 
Suzuki  Hungary  250 million 
Ford  Poland/ Hungary  235 million 
Hyundai  Poland  120 million 
Own calculations based on: Financial Times 25.3.98/ 15.12.97/ 13.2.97, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
10.11.97, EMERGO 2/96, Wirtschaftsnachrichten Ungarn 2/97, Ost-West-Contact 11/ 97 
** Transformation and Globalization Research Group, WZB/May 1998 
Table 2: 
Investment by Country 
 
Country  Group  Planned Investment (up to 
2002, in $) 
Poland  FIAT,    Daewoo,    GM/    
Opel, Isuzu (GM), VW, 
Hyundai, Ford 
4.9 billion 
Czech Republic  VW  2.5 billion 
Hungary  VW, GM/ Opel, Suzuki, Ford  1.3 billion 
Slovakia  VW  240 million 
Own calculations based on: Financial Times 25.3.98/ 15.12.97/ 13.2.97, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
10.11.97, EMERGO 2/96, Wirtschaftsnachrichten Ungarn 2/97, Ost-West-Contact 11/ 97 
** Transformation and Globalization Research Group, WZB/May 1998 -30- 
Table 3: 
Investment by Project: 
 
Country/Group  Planned Investment (up to           Situation at End of 1997 
2002, in $)                                      (in $) 
Poland   
FIAT  1.8 billion                                       1.3 billion 
Daewoo  2.0 billion                                      760 million 
Ford  100 million                                       54 million 
GM/ Opel  550 million                                              * 
Isuzu (GM)  300 million                                             * 
Hyundai  120 million                                             * 
VW  *                                                               * 
Hungary   
VW/ Audi  555 million                                     360 million 
GM/ Opel  390 million                                             * 
Suzuki  250 million                                             * 
Ford  135 million                                             * 
Czech Republic   
VW  2.5 billion                                       1.2 billion 
Slovakia   
VW  240 million                                             * 
* - no figures 
Own calculations based on: Financial Times 25.3.98/ 15.12.97/ 13.2.97, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung 10.11.97, EMERGO 2/96, Wirtschaftsnachrichten Ungarn 2/97/ 1/98, Ost-West-Contact 
11/ 97, Motor 48/97 (Poland) 
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